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The Constitution’s Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses are meant to
prevent corruption and conflicts of interest. The Foreign Emoluments Clause
prohibits some federal officials, including the president, from receiving payments
or other benefits from foreign governments, while the Domestic Emoluments
Clause bans the president from receiving payments other than the office’s salary
from the federal and state governments. To enforce the clauses, this report
recommends requiring the president to divest from business interests and
increasing powers to investigate and punish violations of the clauses.
This report was researched and written during the 2018-2019 academic year by
students in Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution Clinic, which
is focused on developing non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the
nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic's reports are available
at law.fordham.edu/democracyreports.
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Enforcing the Intent of the Constitution’s Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses

Executive Summary
The Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses were included
in the Constitution to prevent corruption and the perception of
conflicts of interest in government. The Constitution’s framers
understood the consequences of corrupt government officials,
particularly executive officers who could be easily bribed or
coerced into acting against the nation’s interests. This report
explores the history of the Emoluments Clauses from the
Constitutional Convention to their modern interpretations,
discusses our understanding of the proper interpretation of the
clauses, and proposes policies to codify the clauses’ spirit.

I. History and Context
The origins of the Emoluments Clauses can be traced to the
1650s, when the Dutch prohibited their foreign ministers from
receiving “any presents, directly or indirectly, in any manner or
way whatever.” Influenced by this rule, the framers added their
own version to the Articles of Confederation, the United States’
first constitution.
The Foreign Emoluments Clause prohibits officers of the United
States from accepting gifts, emoluments, or titles from foreign
governments. At the Constitutional Convention, the framers
discussed their concerns about foreign influence and corruption
in light of gift-giving schemes British monarchs used to
manipulate members of Parliament. Concerned that European
kings might use the same schemes to gain influence over the
newly formed American government, the framers added the
Foreign Emoluments Clause to the Constitution.
The Domestic Emoluments Clause sets terms for the
president’s compensation and bans the president from receiving
emoluments from the United States or any of the individual
states. The framers were not just concerned with corruption
emanating from foreign influence attempts; they recognized
it could also have domestic sources, and they intended the
Domestic Emoluments Clause as a bulwark against those
threats. The Domestic Emoluments Clause was designed to
prevent the president from becoming beholden to Congress or
any of the state governments.
The debate over the definition of “emoluments” as used in
Constitution is ongoing in academia and in the courts. Some
scholars argue “emoluments” should be defined broadly to
include any “profit,” “gain,” “benefit,” or “advantage,” while
others submit that it should be interpreted narrowly to only
include profits derived from carrying out the duties of office.

For decades, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel (“OLC”) has opined on questions regarding the proper
application of the Emoluments Clauses. The publicly available
opinions indicate the OLC has considered partially overlapping
factors when evaluating potential violations of the clauses. In
analyzing questions regarding the Foreign Emoluments Clause,
OLC looks at (1) whether the person or persons in question
hold an “office of profit or trust;” (2) whether the organization
providing the emoluments is truly a foreign government; and
(3) whether the receipt of the emoluments would make the
recipient susceptible to undue influence or corruption. To
resolve questions where the Domestic Emoluments Clause is
implicated, the OLC’s analysis relies primarily on the last factor:
the likely impact of receiving the emoluments.
Government employees and members of Congress are required
to comply with ethics and conflict of interest laws and rules,
some of which enforce the Foreign Emoluments Clause. There is
wide agreement that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to
appointed positions in the federal government. Accordingly, the
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act bars employees in appointed
positions from receiving “gift[s] or decoration[s]” from foreign
governments absent consent from Congress. Even though
there is some debate over whether the Foreign Emoluments
Clause applies to elected officials, ethics rules for members
of the House and Senate state that the Constitution prevents
them from receiving “present[s]” from foreign governments.
These regulations are very much within the spirit of the Foreign
Emoluments Clause in that they ensure that government
employees and members of Congress are not improperly
soliciting or receiving gifts from foreign sources.

II. In Support of a Broad Interpretation
of “Emoluments”
We argue for a broader view of the term “emoluments,” which
bars those subject to the Emoluments Clauses from profiting
from foreign and domestic Emoluments governments. The
framers would have understood the term “emoluments” to have
a broad meaning, defined as any “profit,” “gain,” or “advantage.”
Additionally, when considering the factors the OLC has
looked to in interpreting the Emoluments Clauses as well as
the regulations that Congress and the executive branch have
imposed on themselves to prevent corruption, we believe that a
broader definition is more aligned with the spirit of the clauses.
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III. Policy Proposals

C. Penalties

To better address the concerns that inspired the Emoluments
Clauses, we propose that Congress pass legislation enacting the
clauses’ intent.

The OGE should be authorized to demand that executive
branch employees who violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause
disgorge all profits from the foreign source and work with
OGE to terminate the conflict through supervised divestiture.
Employees who have committed multiple violations or failed to
properly divest from their potentially conflicted assets should
be subject to fines. Given that any president whose conflict
was detected by this OGE unit would be in violation of both
a constitutional provision and the divestment portion of our
proposed legislation, a fine would be an appropriate remedy
in addition to disgorgement and divestment. Depending on
the circumstances, Congress might consider impeachment
proceedings.

A. Mandatory Divestment
We recommend mandating that the president divest from
any businesses that he or she has an ownership interest in by
either liquidating their assets or transferring that interest into a
qualified blind trust for the duration of their presidency.

B. Strengthening Office of Government Ethics
We also recommend strengthening the Office of Government
Ethics (“OGE”) by adding an arm of the office specifically
tasked with investigating potential violations of the Emoluments
Clauses. This unit within OGE should be given the necessary
investigatory tools and resources to examine potential
violations involving executive branch officials. The unit should
also have authority to either take unilateral disciplinary action or
refer the matter to Congress for it decide whether to exercise its
discretion under the Foreign Emolument to provide consent for
receipt of emoluments.

4
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Introduction
Should the president of United States be allowed to profit
from foreign governments or from the United States or any
of the individual states while serving in office? This question,
which has become the subject of increased public debate since
the 2016 presidential election, does not have a clear answer
in the Constitution. The framers were fearful that officers of
the United States, particularly the president, could become

susceptible to undue influence. To protect against corruption,
the framers included the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments
Clauses in the Constitution. But the exact meaning and
application of these clauses is the subject of continuing debate.
In this report, we present the history of the clauses, our position
on their meaning, and our proposal for laws to codify their spirit.
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I. History and Context
The origins of the Emoluments Clauses stretch back to the
1600s. The Dutch, in 1651, barred their foreign ministers from
accepting “any presents, directly or indirectly, in any manner or
way whatever.”1 This rule seems to have directly influenced the
inclusion of a similar clause in the Articles of Confederation,2
the United States’ first constitution.3 When weaknesses in
the Articles of Confederation led the framers to convene in
1787, concerns about corruption persisted. At the Philadelphia
Convention, the framers worried that undue influence from
both foreign and domestic sources could undermine the new
government they were designing. As defense against this
threat, they included the Foreign and Domestic Clauses in the
Constitution.4

A. The Foreign Emoluments Clause
The Foreign Emoluments Clause prohibits officers of the United
States from accepting gifts, emoluments, or titles from foreign
governments. It states:

At the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pickney of South
Carolina made the case for including the Foreign Emoluments
Clause by urging “the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers
[and] other officers of the U.S. independent of external
influence.”10 Edmund Jennings Randolph of Virginia also
advocated for the clause, describing the response in the United
States to a foreign king giving an American ambassador a
present.11 He said, “It was thought proper, in order to exclude
corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office
from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign
states.”12 Randolph asserted that the Foreign Emoluments
Clause was “provided to prevent corruption.”13

B. The Domestic Emoluments Clause
The Domestic Emoluments Clause sets terms for compensation
for the president and bans the president from receiving
emoluments from the United States or any of the individual
states. It states:

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept
of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.5
The impetus for this clause lay in the framers awareness
of the gift-giving schemes that were common in European
governments. British monarchs had a history of manipulating
members of Parliament with “gifts, offices, and other
inducements.”6 And European kings often gave presents to
foreign ministers.7 Benjamin Franklin, well known for his love
of France, found himself at the center of a controversy when
he received a diamond-adorned snuff box from King Louis.8
Concerned about the perception of corruption, Franklin asked
for and was granted permission by Congress to keep the
present.9
1

Norman L. Eisen et al., The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and
Application to Donald J. Trump, BROOKINGS 4 (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emolumentsclause1.pdf.

2

Id.

3

See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 13 (2016).

4

See KEVIN J. HICKEY & MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11086, THE
EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2019).

5

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.

6

Eisen, supra note 1, at 6.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

6

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,
a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.14
The origins of the Domestic Emoluments Clause can be traced
back to provisions in early state constitutions designed to curb
domestic corruption. For example, Maryland’s constitution
prohibited individuals holding offices of public trust from
accepting any presents from foreign states, the United States,
or any of the individual states without consent.15 Similarly,
Massachusetts’ constitution of 1780 set a salary for the
governor to ensure he would “not be under the undue influence
of any of the members of the general court by a dependence on
them for his support.”16 The salary provision further states that
its purpose is to encourage the governor to act in the interest of
the public instead of focusing on his private affairs.17

10 Id. at 4-5 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 389 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
11

Id. at 5 (citing 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).

12 Id.
13 Id.
14

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.

15 M.D. CONST. § XXXII (1776).
16 M.A. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 13 (1780).
17 Id.
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At the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin opposed
compensating the executive for his services. He cited men’s
“love of power, and the love of money” in arguing that a salary
would attract corrupt leaders.18 Franklin did not prevail in his
opposition to a presidential salary provision because other
delegates thought a salary would help maintain the president’s
independence from the legislature.19 Like the Massachusetts
constitution’s salary provision, the Domestic Emoluments
Clause sets a fixed compensation for the president that cannot
be adjusted while the president is in office.20 Without a fixed
salary, the framers believed the legislature might increase or
decrease the president’s compensation to bend him to its will.21
The fixed salary was also intended to prevent the president
from extorting the legislature. The framers were aware of
examples of colonial governors refusing to take certain actions
unless they received pay increases.22 And Franklin, in adamantly
opposing an absolute presidential veto power, had shared
Pennsylvania’s experience with a governor who had frequently
threatened to veto legislation unless the legislature increased
his salary or provided him with other benefits.23
Franklin and John Rutledge were not satisfied that preventing
the legislature from changing the president’s salary would
be enough to prevent corruption—the legislature and state
governments might still seek to provide benefits to the president
to influence his behavior. They proposed adding language to
the salary provision barring the president from receiving “any
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”24
The additional language received swift approval from the other
delegates.25

C. Defining “Emoluments”
The current debate around the definition of “emolument” is
based on how the term was used by the framers, its dictionary
definitions throughout history, and how the Emoluments Clauses

18 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 82 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
19 Brianne J. Gorod et al., The Domestic Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and
Application to Donald J. Trump, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. 4 (July 2017), https://
www.theusconstitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/20170726_
White_Paper_Domestic_Emoluments_Clause.pdf.
20 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; M.A. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 13 (1780).

have been applied. Advocates for a broad interpretation of the
term assert that it includes anything of value.26 As support for
this definition, they look to the influences on the Constitution’s
framers. Among the most significant influences on the framers
were the works of Sir William Blackstone, an English jurist who
authored the “Commentaries on the Laws of England.”27 William
D. Bader asserts that “Commentaries” “was the singularly most
important intellectual influence on the attorneys who drafted
the Constitution.”28 John Mikhail notes that in “Commentaries”
the term emoluments is used broadly to mean “profit,” “gain,”
“benefit,” or “advantage.”29 Mikhail also studied English language
dictionaries published between 1604 and 1806, finding that
in over 92% of these dictionaries, emolument was defined as
“profit,” “advantage,” “gain,” or “benefit.”30
In response to arguments that “emoluments” only refers to
benefits tied to holding public office, Mikhail highlights that
Blackstone used “emoluments” in the “context of family
inheritance, private employment, and private ownership of
land.”31 In addition, Mikhail observes that Blackstone argued
in a copyright case in 1761 that a person should not be able to
profit by publishing another person’s work because doing so
“would be converting, to one’s own Emolument, the Fruits of
another’s Labour.”32
But not all historical evidence necessarily supports a broad
interpretation of “emolument.” Seth Tillman argues that
President Washington’s purchase of public land in office
indicates that the definition of emolument should be narrow.33
Tillman asserts that if the framers meant for “emoluments”
to be interpreted broadly in the Domestic Emoluments
26 See, e.g., Complaint, Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. v. Donald
J. Trump, 276 F.Supp.3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see also Brief for Amici
Curiae Certain Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and in
Opposition to Writ of Mandamus, In re: Donald J. Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th
Cir. 2019).
27 Sir William Blackstone, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, https://www.aoc.gov/art/
relief-portrait-plaques-lawgivers/sir-william-blackstone (last updated Apr.
29, 2016).
28 William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice, 49 DUQ. L.
REV. 35, 40 (2011) (quoting William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone,
Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 9 (1994)).
29 John Mikhail, “Emolument” in Blackstone’s Commentaries, BALKINIZATION
(May 28, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/05/emolument-inblackstones-commentaries.html.

22 See id. at 6.

30 John Mikhail, The Definition of ‘Emolument’ in English Language and
Legal Dictionaries, 1523-1806 1 (June 30, 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2995693.

23 Id. at 5.

31 Mikhail, “Emolument” in Blackstone’s Commentaries, supra note 29.

24 Id. at 6.

32 Id.

25 Id.

33 Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s ‘Emoluments’
Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 764-65 (2017).

21 Gorod, supra note 19, at 1.
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Clause to cover benefits beyond those related to an office,
then Washington’s actions were “grossly negligent” because
he engaged in a private business transaction with the
government.34 But Tillman reasons that Washington would not
have engaged in the sale if the framers’ intended the Domestic
Emoluments Clause to bar such transactions.35 Mikhail agrees
with Tillman that “emolument” in the Domestic Emoluments
Clause is meant to apply only to emoluments the president
receives for his services in office.36
Jed Shugerman disagrees with Tillman’s position, arguing that
Washington may have violated the Domestic Emoluments
Clause.37 Shugerman points out that the framers were fallible
men who were also known to have accepted presents from
foreign states, potentially violating the Foreign Emoluments
Clause.38 Additionally, Shugerman argues there is little evidence
that Washington’s land deal was in fact public, which could
account for the lack of contemporary criticism of the sale.39

1. Office of Legal Counsel’s Interpretations
For decades, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”) has provided guidance to government employees and
officials, including presidents, on potential violations of the
Emoluments Clauses. These decisions have not been entirely
consistent through the years in their definitions of “emolument”
and “Office of Profit or Trust.”40 But the OLC opinions do provide
some of the only insights into interpretations of the Emoluments
Clauses by a government entity. While the opinions do not
explicitly endorse a broad definition of “emoluments,” they
do show that the OLC has consistently considered the anticorruption spirit of the two clauses.
The publicly available opinions41 involving the Emoluments
Clauses indicate that the OLC has considered three factors
when determining whether acceptance of certain profits or
34 Id. at 763.
35 See id. at 763-64.
36 Mikhail, The Definition of ‘Emolument’ in English Language and Legal
Dictionaries, supra note 30, at 21-22.
37 Jed Shugerman, George Washington’s Secret Land Deal Actually Strengthens
CREW’s Emoluments Claim, TAKE CARE (June 2, 2017), https://takecareblog.
com/blog/george-washington-s-secret-land-deal-actually-strengthenscrew-s-emoluments-claim.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See generally Gary J. Edles, Service on Federal Advisory Committees: A Case
Study of OLC’s Little-Known Emoluments Clause Jurisprudence, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1 (2006).
41 The OLC has not published every opinion regarding the Emoluments
Clauses, meaning changes or reversals in the office’s analysis might be
obscured from public view. Id. at 4.
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gains violates either the Domestic or Foreign Emoluments
Clause. In analyzing questions regarding the Foreign
Emoluments Clause, the office considers (1) whether the
person or persons who are receiving the profits or gains hold
an “Office of Profit or Trust,”42 (2) whether the organization
providing the emoluments is truly a foreign government,43
and (3) whether the receipt of the emoluments would make
the recipient susceptible to undue influence or corruption.44
The third component is the main factor for analyzing possible
violations of the Domestic Emoluments Clause.45
The OLC has gradually narrowed its view of the positions that
are “Office[s] of Profit or Trust.”46 In the early 1990s, the office
declared that unpaid members of federal advisory committees
held offices of trust, making them subject to the limitations
in the Foreign Emoluments Clause.47 But within three years
of issuing this interpretation, the office withdrew it. In a letter
to the Legal Advisor of the State Department, the OLC wrote,
“We agree that not every member of an advisory committee
necessarily occupies an ‘Office of Profit or Trust’ under the
Clause and accordingly that the April 29, 1991 OLC opinion on
advisory committees was overbroad.”48
42 See Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the President’s
Council on Bioethics, 29 Op. O.L.C. 55 (2005) (concluding that “to be an
‘office’ a position must at least involve some exercise of governmental
authority, and an advisory position does not.”); Application of Emoluments
Clause to Part-Time Consultant for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
10 Op. O.L.C. 96, 99 (1986) (determining that a part-time consultant held
an office of profit or trust because he was required to take an oath of office,
have a security clearance, follow the rules and regulations of the NRC, and
be “on call to serve the agency.”); Payment of Compensation to Individual
in Receipt of Compensation From a Foreign Government, OFF. LEGAL COUNS.
(Oct. 4, 1954) (analyzing whether a DOJ employee who was appointed by
the attorney general and took oath prescribed for all persons appointed to
offices of honor or profit held an office of profit or trust).
43 See Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government
Employees by Foreign Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994)
(concluding that two NASA employees receiving compensation for
teaching positions at a foreign university while on unpaid leave from NASA
were not violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause because the university
acted independently of the foreign state in making employment decisions);
Expense Reimbursement in Connection with Chairman Stone’s Trip to
Indonesia, OFF. LEGAL COUNS. (Aug. 11, 1980) (concluding that an expense
reimbursement was not an emolument when paid to the chairman of an
independent agency for a consulting trip to Indonesia organized by Harvard
University because the Indonesian government did not directly pay the
reimbursement and did not have a role in choosing the visiting consultants).
44 See Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op.
O.L.C. 1 (2009); President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits
from the State of California, 5 Op. O.L.C 187 (1981).
45 See President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the
State of California, 5 Op. O.L.C 187 (1981).
46 Edles, supra note 40, at 7-9.
47 Id. at 8.
48 Id. at 9.
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Whether the president holds an “Office of Profit or Trust” is
the subject of scholarly debate. Seth Tillman argues that the
president is not an officer under the United States.49 Tillman
points to President Washington’s acceptance of foreign
gifts without the consent of Congress and to a list made by
Alexander Hamilton in response to a request to name all the
persons holding office under the United States.50 Hamilton
did not include the president or other elected officials in this
list.51 But others assert that it is more likely that the Senate was
requesting a list of “civil offices,” which would include appointed
offices instead of elected offices.52 In the OLC’s 2009 opinion
on the applicability of the Foreign Emoluments Clause to
President Barack Obama’s acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize,
the office took a clear position on whether the clause covered
the president. The opinion stated that “the President surely
‘holds an Office of Profit or Trust’…”53
The OLC has maintained that “any emoluments from a foreign
State, whether dispensed through its political or diplomatic
arms or through other agencies are forbidden to Federal officeholders (unless Congress consents).”54 But the office has made
exceptions for some entities tied to foreign governments. It
decided in 1994 that the Foreign Emoluments Clause “does
not apply in cases of government employees offered faculty
employment by a foreign public university where it can be
shown that the university acts independently of the foreign
state when making faculty employment decisions.”55 In the case
of President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize, the office assessed
that the Nobel Committee, which awards the prize, is “not a
‘foreign State’ within the Clause’s meaning.”56
49 Seth Barrett Tillman, The Foreign Emolument Clause Reached Only Appointed
Officers, CONSTITUTION CENTER, https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretations/the-foreign-emoluments-clause-reachedonly-appointed-officers (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Gautham Rao & Jed Shugerman, Presidential Revisionism, SLATE (July 17, 2017,
5:42 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/07/the-new-yorktimes-published-the-flimsiest-defense-of-trumps-apparent-emolumentsviolations.html; Frank Bowman, Foreign Emoluments, the President & Professor
Tillman, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES (Oct. 27, 2019), https://impeachableoffenses.
net/2017/10/27/foreign-emoluments-the-president-professor-tillman/;
contra Seth Barrett Tillman, The Blue Book & the Foreign Emoluments Clause
Cases Against the President: Old Questions Answered, NEW REFORM CLUB (Dec.
31, 2017), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-blue-bookforeign-emoluments-clause.html.
53 Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, supra
note 44, at 4.

Opinions involving the applicability of the Emoluments Clauses
to presidents have placed significant emphasis on whether
receiving emoluments leads to undue influence on the recipient.
One of these opinions, which is unpublished but referenced in
subsequent opinions, concerns the ability of President John F.
Kennedy’s estate to accept naval retirement payments that had
accrued while Kennedy was in office.57 The OLC determined
that these payments would not violate the Domestic
Emoluments Clause because Kennedy had earned them prior to
taking office and he would not have to fulfill any obligations as a
condition of accepting the payments.58 The opinion stated that
its reasoning was based on the purpose of the clause, which the
OLC said would not be furthered by barring receipt of payments
Kennedy was entitled to before taking office.59
Two opinions—one in 1981 from the OLC and another in 1983
from the Comptroller General—analyzed whether President
Ronald Reagan could receive retirement benefits earned while
serving as governor of California. The OLC opinion begins
by considering broad and narrow dictionary definitions of
“emolument.” The narrow definition in the Oxford English
dictionary that the opinion references defined “emoluments”
as “profit or gain arising from station, office, or employment:
reward, remuneration, salary.”60 The broad definition in the
same dictionary described an emolument as an “advantage,
benefit, comfort,” but the opinion calls this definition obsolete.61
Instead of relying solely on the dictionary definitions of the
term, the OLC considers the historical evidence surrounding
the drafting of the Domestic Emoluments Clause. The opinion
observes, “[I]t appears the term emolument has a strong
connotation of, if it is not indeed limited to, payments which
have a potential of influencing or corrupting the integrity of
the recipient.”62 The OLC concludes that “retirement benefits
are not emoluments within the meaning of the Constitution
because interests of this kind were not contemplated by the
members of the Constitutional Convention…”63 The opinion
adds that receipt of such benefits does not violate the “spirit of
the Constitution because they do not subject the President to
any improper influence.”64
57 President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the State of
California, supra note 45.
58 Id. at 189.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 188.
61 Id.

54 Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government
Employees by Foreign Public Universities, supra note 43.

62 Id.

55 Id.

64 Id.

56 Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, supra
note 44, at 4.

63 Id. at 192.
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The 1983 Comptroller General Memo concludes that
“emoluments” as used in the Domestic Emoluments Clause
“does not extend to payments for services rendered prior to the
occupancy of, and having no connection with the Presidency.”65
Citing Federalist 73, the memo states that the purpose of the
clause is to prevent the president from being subject to undue
65 Letter from Milton J. Socolar, Off. of the Comptroller Gen., to George J.
Mitchell, U.S. Senate (Jan. 18, 1983).

influence in carrying out his duties. Accordingly, the memo
reasons that it is inapplicable when the benefits the president is
to receive have already been earned and have no connection to
the presidency.66
These OLC opinions indicate that while the office has generally
viewed the actual profit or gain from foreign and domestic actors
as “emoluments,” they have generally considered each potential
violation on a case-by-case basis to determine if the particular
emoluments in question would have a corrupting influence.
66 Id.
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II. In Support of a Broad Interpretation of “Emoluments”
The Constitution’s framers intended the Emoluments Clauses
to protect against government corruption. This purpose is
hindered by interpretations of the clauses that cover only gains
or profits derived from carrying out the duties of office.
In the Foreign Emoluments Clause, “emoluments” is best
interpreted broadly to bar any profits or benefits from foreign
governments. The Domestic Emoluments Clause should be
interpreted to prevent the president from receiving any profits
or benefits from state governments or the federal government,
aside from his or her salary. A broad reading of the clauses is
not only consistent with the framers’ intentions. It also reflects
the framers likely understanding of the term “emoluments,”
which, as evidenced by John Mikhail’s work, is likely to have
been any “profit,” “gain,” or “advantage.”67 Instead of limiting the
scope of “emoluments” in these clauses, the framers describe
the restrictions imposed by the clauses in broad terms, such
as prohibiting presents, titles, and emoluments of “any kind
whatever” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause.68
67 See generally Mikhail, supra note 30.
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.

Additionally, the OLC’s interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses
indicate that a broader understanding is more aligned with the
clauses’ spirit. In evaluating possible violations of the clauses,
the office has placed significant emphasis on the potential of the
alleged benefits to influence the recipient.69 Bad actors have a
variety of methods to exert influence over government officials
that can go beyond traditional bribery. The framers understood
the concepts of quid pro quo and bribery but chose not to write
the Emoluments Clauses in these terms. The concerns about
corruption extend further than government officials accepting
some benefit in exchange for carrying out official actions.
Instead, concerns of undue influence extend to the states of
mind of these government officials. There is, at the very least,
a perception that a government official who is profiting from a
foreign or domestic government is not truly acting in the best
interests of the United States. The mere perception of undue
influence or corruption could taint every decision made by such
an official. To prevent perceptions of corruption and actual
corruption, the Emoluments Clauses should be interpreted
broadly—how the balance of historical evidence indicates the
framers intended them to be interpreted. As such, the following
proposals embrace the broader definition of emoluments.
69 See President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the
State of California, supra note 45.
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III. Policy Proposals
To better address the concerns that prompted the framers
to include the Emoluments Clauses in the Constitution, we
recommend a federal law mandating that the president divest
from any businesses that he or she has an ownership interest in
by either liquidating their assets or transferring that interest into
a qualified blind trust for the period of their presidency. We also
recommend legislation strengthening the Office of Government
Ethics (“OGE”) by adding an arm of the office specifically
tasked with investigating potential violations of the Emoluments
Clauses by executive branch officials. This unit would have the
authority to either refer matters to the Department of Justice or
to Congress for it to decide whether consent should be granted
to an official to receive foreign emoluments.
This Part begins by describing relevant existing ethics laws
to provide context for our recommendations. The following
three sections of this Part describe the different aspects of
our proposal: (1) a mandatory divestment requirement for
the president; (2) strengthening the Office of Government
Ethics; and (3) the penalties for violating the restrictions in the
Emoluments Clauses. This Part concludes with a discussion of
some of the alternative proposals we considered.

A. Ethics Requirements in Government
Throughout government, employees and members of Congress
are required to comply with ethics and conflict of interest
laws. Published by the Office of Government Ethics, the
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch was codified at 5 C.F.R. Part 2635.70 These regulations
bar employees from “holding financial interests that conflict
with the conscientious performance of duty” or soliciting or
accepting gifts or items of monetary value from any “person
or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or
conducting activities regulated by the employee’s agency,
or whose interests may be substantially affected by the
performance or nonperformance of the employee’s duties.”71
Employees are also prohibited from using their positions for
private gain.72 Additionally, employees are not allowed to accept
or solicit gifts from “prohibited sources” or gifts given to the
employee because of their position in government.73
70 Employee Standards of Conduct, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.
gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Employee%20Standards%20of%20Conduct (last
visited Apr. 20, 2019).

There are some exceptions to accepting unsolicited gifts.
Employees are permitted to accept gifts with a market value of $20
or less per occasion from the same source, but, in a given calendar
year, they cannot accept gifts from the same source with a total
value of more than $50. Food and entertainment in domestic or
foreign settings are also exempted, so long as non-government
employees are not required to pay for the same events.74
Both the House and Senate ethics committees have imposed
rules against the acceptance of gifts. The Senate rules generally
forbid all members, officers, and employees from knowingly
accepting any gifts valued at over $50.75 But the Senate Ethics
Committee’s website states, “The U.S. Constitution prohibits
government officials, including Members, officers, and
employees of Congress, from receiving any present of any kind
from a foreign state or representative without the consent of
Congress.”76 The House Ethics Manual similarly states, “The
Constitution prohibits federal government officials, including
Members and employees of Congress, from receiving ‘any
present . . . of any kind whatever’ from a foreign state or a
representative of a foreign government without the consent of
the Congress.”77 Congress has consented to the acceptance of
some foreign gifts, such as gifts worth no more than $100 given
as souvenirs or as a courtesy.78 Any gift exceeding this value can
only be accepted if a refusal to accept would be offensive to the
giving nation.79 Such a gift is accepted on behalf of the United
States and within 60 days of receipt must be turned over for
disposal.80 But members can request authorization to use the
gift during their tenures.81
Additionally, both Senate and House members and staff
are prohibited from earning significant income from outside
sources and are barred from conducting professional services,
such as legal services, for compensation.82 Finally, the Senate
74 Id.
75 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. No. 113-18, r. XXXV, at 1(2)(A)
(2013); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES r. XXV, at 5(a)(1)(B)(i) (2015).
76 Gifts, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, https://www.ethics.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?p=Gifts (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
77 COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH CONG., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL
57 (2008).
78 See Gifts, supra note 76; Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 5 U.S.C § 7342
(2011); Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act, 22 U.S.C § 2451
(2015).
79 Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 5 U.S.C § 7342 (2011).

71 Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5
C.F.R. pt. 2635.

80 Id.

72 Id.

82 Conflicts of Interest, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, https://www.ethics.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/conflictsofinterest (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).

73 Id.
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81 Id.
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and House restrict their members from serving on the boards of
organizations for compensation.83
These Senate and House rules and statutory provisions
addressing conflicts of interest and the acceptance of gifts
show that Congress is concerned with the possibility of undue
influence on its members and employees. These regulations
are consistent with the spirit of the Emoluments Clauses;
they ensure that members of Congress are not soliciting and
accepting any sort of benefit from sources that might lead to
the appearance of corruption or actual corruption.

B. Mandatory Divestment
Our proposal would require the president and his or her spouse
and minor children to divest from all business interests while
the president is in office. This proposal draws on two proposed
bills that have been introduced in Congress. Senator Elizabeth
Warren introduced the first bill, the Presidential Conflicts
of Interest Act of 2017. It would compel the president, vice
president, and their spouses and minor children to divest from
any business interest that posed a conflict, as determined by
the OGE, by selling the interest and then purchasing conflictfree holdings with the gains from the sale.84 To provide OGE
with sufficient information about the president’s conflicts, the
legislation would require the president and vice president to
file more detailed financial disclosures, including three years of
tax returns.85 The bill provides a cause of action to enforce the
divestiture to the U.S. attorney general, the attorney general of
any state, or any aggrieved person. It further states that failing
to divest is a high crime or misdemeanor,86 which is part of the
Constitution’s standard for impeachment and removal.87
Representative Katherine Clark of Massachusetts proposed a
similar bill in 2019. The Presidential Accountability Act would
amend the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 by adding financial
disclosure requirements for the president and vice president.88 It
would also require the president and vice president to divest any
business interests that created a conflict by either converting
the interest to cash or placing it in a qualified blind trust.89
Neither of these proposed bills have become law.
83 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 75, at r. XXXVII, at 6(a); RULES OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 75, at r. XXV, at 2(d).
84 See Presidential Conflicts of Interest Act of 2017, S. 65, 115th Cong. (2017).
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
88 See Presidential Accountability Act, H.R. 1481, 116th Cong. (2019).
89 See id.

Our proposal would borrow elements from both bills. While
liquidation of business interests is preferable because it would
eliminate all possible conflicts, it would be a difficult imposition
on presidents with complicated or extensive personal holdings.
It might even deter people with substantial assets from
running for office, as it would make transitioning back into their
business lives much more complicated after leaving office. The
Presidential Accountability Act provides a preferable alternative:
letting presidents choose between liquidation and placing the
assets into a qualified blind trust. Qualified blind trusts are
overseen by OGE and ensure that the beneficiary of the trust has
no control over the assets involved.90 Congress mandating that
the president place his or her holdings in this type of trust would
be a stronger step towards preventing conflicts of interest, if not
a completely sufficient preventative measure in all instances.
Elements that we would borrow from Senator Warren’s bill
are the enhanced financial disclosures to OGE and the opinion
of Congress that failure to properly disclose or divest assets
would be a high crime or misdemeanor. Without disclosure to
OGE of all assets it would be impossible to determine whether
a president has properly divested. A statement from Congress
that failing to properly divest would be impeachable offense
would send a clear message to the president that compliance
with the law was required. It would also provide a strong basis
for Congress to initiate impeachment proceedings if it believed
the president’s failure was serious enough to merit such a step.
Our proposal would go further than either of the proposed
bills by mandating that the president divest from all business
interests, instead of only conflicted business interests. This
requirement would go further towards eliminating any
possibility of impropriety and it would make executing the
mandate easier in some respects, as neither OGE nor the
president and their staff would have to engage in the potentially
complex and time consuming process of determining whether
each business interest created a conflict.
The proposed bills require the vice president to abide by the
same divestment requirements as the president, but our proposal
does not impose these obligations on the vice president. The
vice president does not have the same level of decision-making
authority or the same position of public trust as the president, so
the balance between the vice president’s personal interests and
the interests of the public in knowing the government is free of
perceived and actual conflicts of interest weighs more in the vice
president’s favor. We propose that the vice president, as well as
all other members of the executive branch, only be subject to the
second part of our proposal, the newly created watchdog branch
90 See Qualified Blind Trusts, 5 C.F.R. § 2634.403 (2006).
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of OGE. But our proposal would establish a process for timely
divestment of all of the vice president’s business interests should
the vice president ascend to the presidency.
Requiring presidents to divest from their business interests upon
taking office is controversial, even though executive branch
officials routinely divest from their assets before taking office.91
This level of regulation of the executive branch by Congress
might face challenges on a separation of powers theory.92
Some fear that such a divestment requirement would dissuade
qualified candidates from seeking the office by imposing a
reverse property qualification on candidates.93 While we do not
believe that a mandatory divestment would bar anyone eligible
from seeking the presidency, these concerns are valid. No policy
should be implemented that strongly dissuades any group,
including wealthy individuals and those with complex personal
holdings, from running for president. Many who have achieved
financial success have done so through innovative thinking,
discipline, and leadership—all desirable qualities for the nation’s
top executive. Therefore, it will be important for Congress
to structure the divestment requirement to avoid needlessly
discouraging anyone from running for president.

C. Strengthening the Office of Government
Ethics
The second part of our proposal calls for a new OGE unit to
investigate conflicts of interest, including violations of the
Emoluments Clauses. Others have recently advocated for
strengthening OGE’s power to enforce ethical standards in the
federal government.94 While executive branch officials are barred
by statute from participating in matters in which they have a
personal financial stake,95 OGE has limited authority to investigate
or enforce ethics laws.96 Additionally, the president and vice
91 See, e.g., Paulson to Sell His Goldman Shares, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/22/business/22disclose.html; Laura
Litvan, Billionaire Pritzker Confirmed as Commerce Secretary, MORNING CALL
(June 26, 2013), https://www.mcall.com/news/mc-xpm-2013-06-26-mcpritzker-commerce-20130626-story.html.
92 We believe that this type of law would survive such a challenge, as
Congress would not be acting outside of their legislative power and is not
increasing its own power at the executive’s expense or undermining the
proper role of the executive. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-95
(1988).
93 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Seth B. Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth Univ.
(Mar. 15, 2019).
94 See, e.g., Executive Branch Comprehensive Ethics Enforcement Act of
2018, H.R. 5902, 115th Cong. (2018); NAT’L TASK FORCE ON RULE OF LAW
& DEMOCRACY, BRENNAN CNTR. FOR JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
TaskForceReport_2018_09_.pdf.
95 See Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest, 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2010).
96 See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON RULE OF LAW & DEMOCRACY, supra note 94, at 12.
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president are exempt from the statute preventing conflicts of
interest.97 Our proposal would give a new OGE unit authority to
investigate both appointed and elected officials in the executive
branch for conflicts of interest. This unit’s investigatory mandate
would draw from the language of the Emoluments Clauses by
focusing on both conflicts of interest with foreign governments
and foreign government-controlled companies as well as with the
federal government and the states.
If the unit found potential conflicts of interest or Emoluments
Clause violations, it would be required to refer the matter to
the Department of Justice if it violated existing conflicts of
interest statutes. Where the issue involved a possible violation
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, OGE would be required
to refer the matter to Congress so lawmakers could decide
whether to exercise their constitutional authority to consent to
the receipt of emoluments.98 These referrals would not have to
be made public initially, consistent with the general principle
of avoiding disclosure of the identities of individuals who are
under investigation. This unit would need the investigative tools
to thoroughly conduct its work. Accordingly, Congress should
provide it subpoena power and the authority to issue fines for
failure to cooperate with its investigations.
Congress might consider placing it members under the
jurisdiction of this new OGE unit. This proposal is designed to
strengthen public trust, and it is important from that standpoint
for members of Congress to be held to same standards as other
government officials. While the statute creating the unit would
have to be designed to avoid separation of powers issues and
running afoul of the Speech and Debate Clause, Congress could
decide to expand the scope of the unit to shine a spotlight on
areas where congressional business interests create perceived
or actual conflicts.

D. Penalties
The new OGE unit would need a way to penalize Emoluments
Clause violations that Congress did not consent to. Federal law
provides penalties for executive branch officials who participate
in matters in which they have a financial stake.99 OGE should
be authorized to demand that officials who violate the Foreign
Emoluments Clause without breaking current conflict of interest
laws disgorge all profits from the foreign source and work with
97 See Andrew Stark, Can a President Trump Keep His Business Intact?, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/
trump-holdings-conflict-of-interest/503333/.
98 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
99 See Penalties and Injunctions, 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2011).
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OGE to terminate the conflict through supervised divestiture.
Employees who commit multiple violations or fail to properly
divest from their potentially conflicted assets should face fines.
Devising a penalty structure for the president is more
challenging. The current position of the Department of Justice
is that the president cannot be indicted for alleged criminal
conduct,100 but that position does not explicitly rule out fines.101
Given that any president whose conflict was detected by the
new OGE unit would be in violation of both a constitutional
provision and the divestment portion of our proposed
legislation, a fine would be an appropriate remedy in addition
to disgorgement of profits and any required divestment.
Depending on the circumstances, Congress would also have the
option of commencing impeachment proceedings.
If Congress were to decide to impose self-regulation via this
new OGE unit, penalties could range from mandated recusal
on a vote to possible divestment. To comply with separation of
powers concerns, it would be necessary for OGE to have less
unilateral sanctioning power over members of Congress than its
authority over executive branch officials.

E. Alternative Proposals
We considered several alternative options for addressing
violations of the Emoluments Clauses.

1. Private Cause of Action
Congress could pass a statute describing what constituted
violations of the Emoluments Clauses and creating a cause of
action for parties to seek judicial review of possible violations.
Congress has the authority to recognize specific rights in certain
people and entities and to allow them to file lawsuits to enforce
those rights.102 Congress could use this authority to allow parties
whose business interests were injured by the unconstitutional
receipt of emoluments by the president or another executive
official to seek judicial review. Congress could also outline
declaratory and injunctive relief for a court to provide in such
a suit. While violation of a statute alone does not necessarily
guarantee standing,103 any plaintiff who could show the injury
described by the statute would likely be given standing.
Congress could also attempt to grant itself a cause of action by

100 A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000).
101 Id. at 230.
102 See, e.g., Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Right of
Review, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2014).

granting the right to sue to the Speaker of the House or Senate
Majority Leader acting on behalf of their institutions.104
This type of legislation would have several disadvantages
compared to our primary proposal. It is possible but unlikely
that presidential emoluments could be properly regulated
through lawsuits. Lawsuits move at a slow pace and presidential
terms are not particularly long, meaning that by the time any
issues were resolved the president might be almost out of office
or could have been compelled to make a critical decision that
was possibly influenced by their conflict of interest. Further,
a bill that has no clear enforcement mechanism is ripe for
abuse by presidents who are deceptive about their business
interests and personal assets. Nevertheless, a bill creating a
cause of action would be an upgrade over the current paucity of
regulatory and enforcement options.

2. Concurrent Resolution
Congress could pass a concurrent resolution outlining its
interpretation of the Emoluments Clauses. A concurrent
resolution is passed by both houses of Congress to set rules
for the Congress or to express its position on an issue.105 These
resolutions are not submitted to the president and do not carry
the force of law.106 While a resolution outlining Congress’s
position on the Emoluments Clauses would not be directly
enforceable, it could serve an important public education
function, assist courts in reviewing the clauses, and instruct
executive branch officials on the behavior expected of them.

3. Constitutional Amendment
A constitutional amendment might clarify the existing
language of the Emoluments Clauses or override them with a
new anti-conflict of interest provision. But such an amendment
seems impractical for two reasons. First, amending the
Constitution is extremely difficult and would require much
greater political consensus than the other proposals already
listed. Second, the Constitution already includes these
Emoluments Clauses, and, even if their exact interpretation
is up for debate, their general purpose seems clear. Congress
should focus on clarification of the existing language instead of
trying to restart the entire debate.
104 See ALISSA M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCG. SERV., R42454,
CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN ARTICLE III COURTS: STANDING TO SUE (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42454.pdf.
105 See Types of Legislation, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm (last visited July 31, 2019).
106 Id.

103 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
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Conclusion
It is time for Congress to enforce the anti-corruption purpose
behind the Emoluments Clauses. The proposed reforms will
prevent self-dealing in government and strengthen confidence
that government officials are acting in the public interest.
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